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The model analyzed here constrains most work on the main job to be
full time. Partial retirement requires a job change and a wage reduction.
Estimates of utility function parameters andtheirdistributions incorporate
information on age of leaving the main job and of full retirement. These
estimates determine the slope at different ages and the convexity of within
period indifference curves between ctpensation and leisure. Even though age
specific dunmiyvariablesare not used, the model closely tracks retirement












Analysis of retirement behavior has progressed rapidly from theestima-
tion of reduced form equations which were linkedonly loosely, if at all, to
any theoretical framework, to the structural analysis presented i.n thepath-
breaking study by Roger Gordon and Alan Blinder (1980). Much of thisprogress
reflects the increasing feasibility of estimating structural modelsdirectly
using maximumlikelihoodtechniques. However, the usefulness of this approach
depends, as always in econometrics. on the accurary of the specification of
the underlying model. It is our contention that there remainserious problems
in the specification of these models which must be remedied beforewe have
an estimated structural model accurately depicting the retirement decision.
The purpose of this paper is to estimate a moreappropriately specified model
and to assess how the improved specification affects the estimates.
Previous work has had problems in two broad dimensions of specification
which will be addressed in this paper.1 First, available structuralretirement
models misrepresent the choices facing older workers. pirical evidence from
the micro data sets indicates that most older workers are unable to reduce
their work effort below full—time without leaving the job they held in their
prime working years. Further, workers who do partially retire and reduce
their work effort below full-time, either in the same job or in a different
one, generally must accept a reduced hourly compensation rate in order to do
2
so.
1For a list of additionalquestions about available studies, see Henry
Aaron (1982). To the extent that the questions Aaron raises remain unanswered,
especially those questions pertaining to savings, consumption andbequest
behavior by older individuals, a considerable amountoffundamental work re-
mains to bedone.
2For a detailed discussion of thesepoints, see Alan Gustman and Thomas
Steinmejer (1982 and1983a).2
The second broad dimension of specification to be addressed in this paper
involves the presumed manner by which individuals reach retirement decisions
given the opportunities available to them. Clearly, the choice of retirement
date is one of the more fundamental aspects of the life cycle decision regard-
ing lifetime labor supply. However, some of the previous work employs
utility function specifications which are not appropriate for a life cycle
analysis.1 Other work recognizes the life cycle nature of the retirement
decision but makes drastic simplifications in the model in order to facilitate
solution and estimation.2 None of the previous structural retirement studies
is based on a complete solution to a life cycle model for hours of work at
various ages.
As would be expected, misspecifying the opportunity set and the manner
in which individuals reach retirement decisions leads to biased parameter est-
imates. But in addition, the use of an overly simplified specification has
led previous investigators to overlook important information pertaining to
retirement-—information which helps to explain the choices individuals make.
In particular, whether or not an individual partially retires at all, and if
so for how long, provides important clues about the nature of his preferences
1lncluded in this group is the work of Anthony Zabalza, Christopher
Pissarides and M. Barton (1980), who do, however, use a model which treats
partial retirement in a more realistic manner than many of the other papers.
2For example, Gordon and Blinder consider a three—period model in which
the three periods are "past," "present," and "future." Assuming full—time
work in the past, they derive two formulae for the reservation wage in the
present, depending on whether or not the individual works in the future.
Whether or not the individual works in the future, however, depends on the
very parameters they are trying to estimate. Hence, Gordon and Blinder face
the chicken—and—egg problem: the proper reservation wage equation to use for
a particular individual depends on the parameter values, but in order to
estimate the parameter values, they must already know which equation applies
to each individual. In their empirical estimation, they sidestep this problem
by using a reservation wage equation which is a compromise of the two derived
reservation wage equations, without trying to decide which one is right for
a particular person.3
and the way they are changing over time. But the specifications employed in
most previous studies are unable to use these clues. Gordon and Blinder, in
their innovative work, use a model in which everyone would partially retire
at some time, since in their model partial retirement entails no penalty in
terms of a lower hourly compensation.1 Olivia Mitchell and Gary Fields (1983)
assume that all work takes place on a full—time basis. No partial retirement
is allowed in their model. Gary Burtless and Robert Moffitt (1983) allow
either partial or full retirement in their model, but not both. They assume
that an individual who does partially retire works on a part-time basis at
a constant number of hours for the rest of his life.2
To meet the objective of this paper, we construct and estimate a
structural, life cycle retirement model which remedies these deficiencies.
The model specification assumes that individuals can partially retire and
reduce their work effort below full-time, but that in doing so, most will incur
a reduction in their hourly compensation rate. This specification allows the
estimation procedure to use information on the timing of transitions among
full—time work, partial retirement, and full retirement to gauge the nature
of preferences regarding consumption and leisure and the way that these pref-
erences may be changing as individuals become older. Retirement decisions in
the model are based on a complete solution to the life cycle labor supply
'In this context, it is of interest to note a cotent contained in a
recent paper by Alan Blinder (1982, P. 54 fn.): "In the 'if—I—had—it—to—do—
over-again' department, one thing I regret is assuming ...thatthe individual
can work as few hours as he pleases. It is a convenient assumption, since
it enabled us to translate the utility function into a reservation wage
function arid then simply compare the reservation wage to the market wage.
However, I have grave doubts about its realism.
2Iri contrast to the assumption adopted by Burtless and Moffltt, Alan
Gustman and Thomas Steiruneier (1983b) report that the average duration of
partial retirement is about three years.4
problem, with optimal control techniques beingutilized to find this solution.
Theremainder of the paper may beoutlined as follows. In Section II
the life cycle model is developed along the lines suggested above,and a
method for solving this model is sketched. Section III introduces the sto-
chastic specification of the model and derives the likelihood function used
in the estimation. Section IV discusses how the retirement sequence andthe
budget constraint for various individuals are calculated fromthe information
in the Retirement History Survey, which is the principal data set usedin
this study. Parameter estimates are presented in Section V for a sample of
older white males who are not self-employed, and these estimates are compared
to analogous estimates obtained when the model is constrained as it has been
by previous investigators. In Section VI the model is used to krackretire-
ment probabilities at different ages. This model does not, as do a number
of other, incorporate dunmty variables for ages 62 and 65 in the utility func-
tion, and consequently whether or not it produces the observed peaks of retire-
ment activity at those ages is one test of whether it generates realistic
retirement behavior. In this section, the model is also applied to investi-
gate the sensitivity of retirement behavior to long-term wage growthand to
the incentives provided by Social Security benefits, pension benefits, and
mandatory retirement. The results are compared to those obtained from a model
which ignores the possibility of partial retirement work at a reduced compen-
sation rate. The final section discusses further policy applications and
presents conclusions.
II. A Life Cycle Model of Retirement Behavior.
The model employed in this paper is a dynamic life cycle model which re-
flects the incentive effects of pension plans and Social Security, and which5
incorporatesthe fact that hours can be reduced below full—time, but only at
the cost of a reduced compensation rate. The natural framework for analyz-
ing models of this type is the theory of optimalcontrol.1 In this frame-
work, the individual is presumed to be trying to maximize a lifetime utility
function of the form
u =u(C(t),L(t), t] dt
where C(t) is consumption at timet,L(t) is leisure at time t, and T is the
relevant time horizon over which the maximizationisdone. Leisureispre-
sumed to be measured in unitssuchthat it is constrained torangein value
between 0 and1.The utility function is maximized with respect to consump-
tion, leisure, and work effort subject to the lifetime budget constraint
(1) A0 +10Tet [Yt —C(t))dt =0
where A is initial assets, Y(t) is compensation at time t (including any
increments to the present value of Social Security and pension benefits), and
r is the real interest rate. Y(t) and L(t)takeon values of Y,(t) and 0,
respectively, if the individual chooses full—time work; otherwise, they take
on values of Y(H(t)] and l_H(t) respectively, where H(t) is the amount
of labor supplied to the partial retirement job. Y,[] is the function relat-
ing partial retirement work effort to compensation and reflects theeffects
of Social Security and pension rules as well as the actual wage rate on
caupensation.
The calculations may be reduced, along the lines suggested by Thomas
1Similar results could be obtained using a discrete tir'e framework with
fairly short time intervals, much as similar solutions are obtained from
analogous systems of differential and difference equations. In the empirical
work, the optimal control modelisimplemented using one—year time periods.6
4aCurdy(1981), to the problem of choosing C(t),L(t),Y(t), and full—time
work vs. partial retirement work vs. full retirement at each moment in time
so as to maximizethequantity
u[C(t), L(t), t +kert[Y(t)—C(t)]
where the value of the parameter k is constant across time, where L(t) is
subject to the restrictions indicated above, and where the expression
ert[Y(t) —C(t)1is recognized as the discounted value of savings at time
In this problem, the individual generates utility during the current period
in three ways: directly through consumption, directly through leisure, and
indirectly through savings which are then converted to direct utility in
other periods. The individual chooses consumption and work effort, and there-
by savings, so as to maximize the utility, both direct and indirect, generated
during the period. In this formulation, the parameter k has a natural inter-
pretation as the marginal utility of discounted savings either generated or
used during the period. Its value depends upon the wage offers and the shape
of the utility function throughout the entire life cycle, and it is thus the
vehicle through which decisions and opportunities in other periods affect
the choices in the current period.
To determine the appropriate value of k to use in the maximization, note
that the savings generated at each moment in time, as determined by the above
maximization problem, must justsatisfythe lifetime budget constraint (equa-
tion (1)1 over an individual's lifetime. For a value of k that is too large,
the individual will work so much and consume so little over the life cycle
that the lifetime budget constraint will show a surplus, which cannot be
1For detailed discussion of the solution of the controlproblem, see
Gustman and Steinmeier (1983c, pp. 4—12).7
optimal. If the value of k is too low, the solution of the optimization
problem at each moment in time will create a deficit in the lifetime budget
constraint and hence will not be feasible. Only for the proper value of k
will the results of the period—by—period optimization problem just satisfy
the lifetime budget constraint. Unfortunately, except under special cir-
cumstancesit is not possible to write down a closed—form analytic expression
for k, and hence for the functions C(t) and L(t)whichsolve the optimal con-
trol problem.For a specific utility function, though, the values can be
readilyapproximated using numerical techniques on a computer.
The above problem maybe restatedas choosing L(t), Y(t), and full—time
work vs.partial retirement work vs. full retirement at each moment in time
soas to maximize the expression
u*[Y(t), L(t), t, k] =supu[C(t), L(t), t] +kert[Y(t)-C(t)]
C(t)
This allows the problem to be analyzed using standard indifference curves.
Figure 1 illustrates a set of indifference curves between income and leisure
that is associated with u.1 The curvature of these curves is related to
the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure in the original
utility function u. The segmented line ABC represents income and leisure
opportunities available to the individual if he partially retires, with the
kink at B reflecting a feature of the opportunity set such as effect of an
earnings test associated with Social Security which, even after recomputation, is
notactuarially fair. The point D represents incte available if the individual
1Note that these indifference curves reflectmore than justpreferences,
since their shape depends through the parameter k on the opportunities avail-
able over the rest of the life cycle. Also, it may be shown with a little
work that the slope of these indifference curves depends on L(t) but not on
Y(t), with the implication that all the indifference curves at a particular
time t are vertical displacements of one another.8
Figure 1






worksfull-time at the relatively higher compensation rate. In the diagram
as illustrated, the individual would be partially retired and working just
enough not to have any of his earnings subject to the earnings test.
In the empirical analysis, we use the following CES specification for
the utility function:
(2) u(C(t), L(t), t] =si(5)(tC(t))5+e
where is a vector of explanatory variables which affect the relative weight
of leisure in the utility function at time t,is the associated vector of
parameters which is presumed to be constant across both time and individuals,
is a time—invariant stochastic term affecting the relative weight of leisure
for the individual, and S (with 5 < 1) is a time—invariant stochastic term
defining the within-period elasticity of substitution between consumption
and leisure.1'2 This specification of the utility function follows the spec-
ification used by Gordon and Blinder. In this specification, the within—
more general formulation of the CES utility function would raise the
expression in brackets to the power v/S and premultiply the result by the time
preference factor exp(—nt). In the context of the model, however, the princ-
ipal indication of time preference is the rapidity with which consumption
declines over time (since X includes age, the separate effect of time pref-
erence cannot be readily identified on the basis of labor supply behavior
alone), and the principal indication of v/S is the degree to which consumption
rises or falls when an individual retires. As is the case with most longi-
tudinal data sets, the Retirement History Survey contains relatively poor
consumption data, which in turn implies poor identification of both v and n.
Latersensitivity analysis indicates that the estimated parameter values are
not very sensitive to the omission of the time preference term; similar
sensitivity analysis for the exponent is precluded because the resulting non—
separability of the utility function very considerably increases the computa-
tional complexity of the estimation procedure. The omission of these para-
meters from the utility function should not seriously impair the usefulness
of the model for the analysis of labor supply and retirement behavior, but it
does suggest that a great deal of caution should be exercised in using the
model to examine issues regarding either constmtption or savings behavior.
21f the utility function were not premultiplied by sign(S), then the
(footnote 2 continued on next page)10
period elasticity of substitution is calculated as 0 =1/(l—
Ifthe individual has a 6 relatively close to unity, the indifference
curves in Figure 1 will be nearly linear, while if 6 is negative, the indif-
ference curves will be more sharply curved. Over time, one would expect
that the effect of the time—dependent variables in would be such that the
individual places an increasing weight on leisure as he grows older, which
would be reflected in Figure 1 as an increasingly steep set of indifference
curves. If the indifference curves are nearly linear, this will at some
point in time induce the individual to quit full-time work at a point like
D and to retire fully at A. On the other hand, if the indifference curves
are sharply curved, the individual is likely to find it to his advantage to
spend some time partially retired along the segmented line ABC after he quits
full-time work. Over time, as the indifference curves become still steeper,
he reduces his partial retirement work effort until finally he fully retires
at point A.
III. The Estimation Technique
The estimation procedure uses two basic pieces of information to infer
the nature of the distribution of 6. The first is the fraction of individuals
who partially retire to the fraction who proceed directly from full-time work
to full retirement. If the distribution of 6 is bunched around unity, the
model predicts that almost no one should ever partially retire, whereas if
(footnote 2 continued from previous page)
marginal utility of consumption would be negative for negative values of 5.
This would restrict economically meaningful values of 6 to lie within the
range of 0 to 1 and would preclude elasticities of substitution less than one.
To avoid an interpretation of negative utility when the factor sign(S) is
included in the specification, one could include a large positive constant
term which is added to u for individuals with a negative value of 6. Such
an additive constant in the utility function will have no influence on the
optimal time paths of C(t), L(t), or the choice of jobs.11
the bulk of the distribution represents low values of 5, the model predicts
that almost no one would fully retire directly after full-time work without
first spending time in partial retirement. The second piece of information
relevant to establishing the nature of the distribution of 6 is the general
relationship between retirement age and the overall level of wages over the
life cycle. If the distribution of 6 is clustered around unity, then consump-
tion and leisure are highly substitutable, and the higher the compensation
path the later the individual should wish to retire. For lower average
values of 6, consumption and leisure are complements, and the retirement age
should be negatively related to the overall level of the compensation path.
The estimated distribution of 6 will reflect both the relative number of
individuals who do and do not partially retire and the observed correlation
between the retirement age and the overall level of compensation over the
life cycle. The estimates may not reflect either piece of information per-
fectly, but will in general represent a compromise between the two.
The second major issue to be resolved by the estimation procedure is
how fast the coefficient of the leisure term in the utility function is in-
creasing over time, which governs how rapidly the indifference curves illus-
trated in Figure 1 are becoming steeper as the individual grows older. Again,
there are two important pieces of evidence. The first is the response of
retirement behavior to changes in compensation such as those occurring at
ages 62 and65for manyindividuals.If the indifference curves are becoming
steeper quite rapidly, then an individual will be sensitive to small changes
in ccmpensation rates for only a short period of time,andany peaks in re-
tirement activity due to age—related changes in compensation are likely to
be quite small. Just the reverse is true if the indifference curves are
becoming steeper only slowly. A second piece of evidence bearing on the speed12
at which the indifference curves are becoming steeper is the length of time
that an individual who does partially retire spends in that state. If the
indifference curves become steeper only slowly, then many of the individuals
who do partially retire should spend a considerable amount of time partially
retired. If the indifference curves are rapidly becoming steeper, then the
average length of a spell of partial retirement should be short. Theesti-
mation procedure adjusts the coefficient of the time—related variables in
the coefficient of the leisure term in the utility function to reflect both
of these pieces of evidence, although again the actual estimates will repre-
sent a compromise between the two.
Before describing the estimation procedure, it will be helpful first to
specify the nature of the stochastic distributions for (5 arid .Thestochas-
tic distribution of 6 is assumed to come from the following exponential
distribution:
—y(l —6) f(5) =ye
where y is a positive parameter defining thedistribution.1 For the stochas-
tic distribution of c,whichaffects the steepness of the indifference curves,
the normal distribution was used:
1The fact that f(rS) is a single-parameter distribution means that the
median, mean, and variance are all uniquely related to one another. Our
earlier work used a two—parameter distribution, namely a truncated normal
with parameters u6andG. Estimates of U6 tended to lie well above unity,
so that the part of the distribution below unity consisted entirely of the
extreme lower tail of the distribution, and the estimates of and
appeared to be rather unstable. The inability to estimate a two—parameter
distribution is less surprising in light of the kind of information available
to the estimation procedure in order to identify the distribution, as dis-
cussed at the beginning of this section. Substitution of the exponential
distribution for the normal distribution eliminated the instability of the
parameter estimates, since there was now only a single parameter to be esti-
mated, and it also provided improved values for the likelihood function.13
I6' N(p6,c)
Inthisdistribution, the parameter Odescribesthe conditional variance of
individual preferences regarding leisure, and the parameter p provides a
means by which the two stochastic terms in the model may be correlated.
The estimation procedure used in this study is maximumlikelihood,which
requires the calculation of the probability that each individual would have
chosen the retirement behavior which was in fact observed, conditional on
the opportunities that were available to him. To clarify how this probability
was calculated for each individual, consider a set of values for the para-
meters of the model. For convenience, let this set of values be denoted by
the vector 0, which includes (5, c, p, and 8. For a given set of parameter
values, and for the wage opportunities available to the individual, the
observed retirement behavior of the individual places limits on the values
of the stochastic variables 6 and e. Panel a of Figure 2, which pertains to
an individual whose retirement behavior is observed at only a single point
in time, illustrates the basic calculation. In this figure, F defines a
region of values for 6 and Cforwhich the individual would chose to continue
working full—time. and define analogous regions for partial retirement
and for full retirement.1 The region 2F corresponding to working full-time
is an area with (algebraically) low values of C.Inthe utility function,
a low value of Cimpliesthat the individual derives relatively little util-
ity from leisure, and he is likely to be working full—time in order to gain
the income necessary to derive utility from consumption goods. In contrast,
1Finding the boundaries for these regions is the difficult part of the
calculation. The computations are considerably eased by the assumed
separability of the utility function, but they are nevertheless quite messy.
For a more detailed description of the calculations, see Appendix A.Figure 2. Regions of the Stochastic Variables Corresponding











inthe region S2R corresponding to full retirement, the values of Earealge-
braically high, indicating that the individual places great value on leisure
andis likely to be retired. The precise location of the boundary depends
on the individual's current wages relative to his opportunities over the course
ofhis life cycle. It may be located in the zone of either positive or nega-
tive E's. For the region corresponding to partial retirement, the most
noticeable characteristic is that none of the region extends above a certain
critical value of 5. In Figure 1, a high value of 6 is associated with in-
difference curves with relatively little curvature, and under such circum-
stances the individual is likely to be found either working full—time at point
D or fully retired at point A. For lower values of 6, which are associated
with more sharply curved indifference curves,theindividual will be partially
retired for some values of E. The lower the value of 5, in general, the
wider will be the range of cforwhich the individual will be partially re-
tired at a particular time t.
Similar regions can be defined for an individual who is observed in
several different years. Figure 2(b) illustrates a typical case involving
observations in three different years. In this diagram, the right-hand in-
verted Y separates the (5, ) plane into three parts according to whether the
individual would be fully retired, partially retired, or not retired at all
in Year 1. These boundaries are derived in exactly the same fashion as the
boundaries were derived for the case with only one observation. Combinations
to the right of the inverted Y would lead to the individual being fully re-
tired in Year 1, while combinations below or to the left would lead to the
individualbeing partially retired orworking full-time, respectively, in
thatyear.
8yYear2(presumedto be later), the effect of thetime—dependent16
explanatory variables in in the utility function will cause the individual
to place a relatively greater weight on leisure as he grows older. In general,
a relatively greater weight on leisure in the utility function will serve to
shift the inverted Y, which defines the boundaries of the three regions, to
the ]eft. The region for which the individual will still be working full—
time has shrunk, and the region for which the individual will be fully retired
has expanded. The same process repeats itself again in Year 3, with the bound-
aries among full retirement, partial retirement, and full—time work being
defined by the left—hand inverted Y in the diagram. The three inverted Y's
defined in this manner divide the (6, c) plane into regions corresponding to
various retirement sequences. For instance, the region PR defines a region
of values for 6andCforwhich the individual would be working full-time
in Year 1, partially retired in Year 2, and fully retired in Year 3.
To calculate the value of the probability that individual i would have
chosen the observed retirement sequence S., first find the region 15.(B) which
defines the combinations of 6andC which would have caused the individual
to have followed the observed sequence S1.1 Note that the boundaries of this
region depend explicitly on the parameter vector ,sincethese parameters in
part determine how the individual will behave when confronted with a given
time path of compensation. The probability that the stochastic variables would
have taken on values in the region 25. (s),andhence would have generated the
sequence S., is.
1The retirement sequences contain two important pieces of information:
the timing of the individual's departure from full-time work and the timing
of his entry into full retirement. Partial retirement is implied if the
timing of these two events is not the same. It is the fact that this estima-
tion procedure uses these two pieces of information, whereas previous studies
have used at most one, that permits, and indeed requires, the use of two
stochastic variables in the specification.17
Pr.(S,; 8) =!fç()f(6? C;Y C1 P)dCd6
where f(6,C;y, Q) is the joint probability density function of the sto-
chastic variables 6andC. The value of this density function for specific
values of 6andC depends on the parameters ", andQ, as noted explicitly
in the function.
The likelihood function is calculated as the product of the probabilities
in the sample:
N
Z(O) =r Pr.(S.;8) — 1 1 —
whereN is the number of individuals in the sample. Maximum likelihood esti-
mates of the parameters of the model are found by maximizing this likelihood
function with respect to the parameters.
IV. pirical Specification.1
The data set used in this study is the Retirement History Survey (RHS),
a random longitudinal sample of approximately 11,000 households. The RHS
sample consists of households whose heads were between the ages of 58 and 63
in 1969. Detailed questionnaires were administered to these households every
two years from 1969 through 1979. This study uses the survey results through
1975, which were the latest results available at the time the study was begun.
Due to the complexity of the estimation procedure, the sample actually used
in the estimates and simulations in this paper is formed by taking every tenth
household from the RHS. The sample is further restricted to white males who
were not self—employed when working full—time; the effects of differences in
constraints, opportunity sets, and preferences among males vs. females and
blacks vs. whites is important and complicated enough to require separate
1Further details of the empirical specification are contained in Gustman
and Steirimeier (1983c).18
analysis. Observations are dropped if critical information is missing, al-
though a major effort is made to impute missing information if at allpossible.1
The final sample consists of 494 observations.
In view of the complexity of estimating an optimal control model, a
parsimonious choice is made for the set of explanatory variables to be inclu-
ded in the vector X. The explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis
include a constant, age (X1), a duxruny variable equal to unity if the individual
haspreviously experienced a longterm health problem (X2) ,andvintage (X3)
expressed asthelast two digits of the year of birth. The coefficients
associated with these variables are SC)'l'2' and For positive values
of and 2 (the coefficients of age and the health dummy variable, respec-
tively), the utility function of an individual places an increasing emphasis
on leisure over time, causing the within—period indifference curves to become
increasingly steep. It is this increasing weight on leisurewhich eventually
causesretirement in the model.
The retirement sequences used in the empirical analysis are formed on the
basis of a question which asked the respondents whether they considered them-
selves to be completely retired, partially retired, or not retired atall.2
1Missirig information of one of two types was the primary reason that ob-
servations were dropped; either there was insufficient information to impute
partial retirement wages, or there was not at least one observation of full—
time wage. At least one actual observation for a full—time wage is required
because an important determinant of behavior in this model is the ratio of
full-time compensation to partial retirement compensation, and an actual obser-
vation on a full—time wage provides a general indication as to whether this
ratio is likely to be high or low for the individual. This requirement does
not, however, cause observations to be dropped simply because individuals were
already partially or fully retired when the survey began. Normally, the re-
quired information is provided in answer to questions about the individual's last
job.
2Distinguishingbetween full-time work and partial retirement work on the
basis of self—response eliminates the need for arbitrary distinctions as to
the individual's retirement status based on hours of work per week, weeks of
(footnote 2 continued on next page)19
This question was asked in every survey year, and since it is a relatively
innocuous question at the beginning of a major section of the survey, it was
almost always answered whenever a survey was administered. For most in-
dividuals, the retirement sequence consists of a set of four observations
on retirement status (one observation every two years from 1969 to 1975).
In cases where the individual dropped out of the sample either because of death
or refusal to answer the questionnaire, the retirement sequence includes fewer
than four observations. The estimation procedure described in the previous
section, however, can be used for any number of observations on retirement
status, and hence it is possible to usewhateverobservations on retirement
status are available for each individual in the data set.1
A problem arises with what may be called "reverse" sequences, which occur
when an individual reported himself to be not retired at all after previously
reporting himself to be partially or fully retired, or when he reported him-
self to be partially retired after previously reporting himself to be fully
retired.2 The problem is that the model described previously (as well as those
(footnote 2 continued from previous page) work per year, and/or sharp drops
in wage rates (as in Burtless and Moffitt (1983)). It also reduces consider-
ably the problem of missing information which would otherwise arise if data
on hours, weeks, and/or wage levels are required to distinguish between the
two types of work. For a comparison of the retirement statistics obtained
using reported as opposed to objective measures of retirement, and an illus-
trationof the sensitivity of parameter estimates to the definition of retire-
ment status in the context of reduced form equations, see AlanGustinariand
ThomasSteinmeier (1981 and forthcoming).
most cases, the individual's response regarding retirement statusis
takenat face value. However, the samplecontains some individuals who said
thatthey were partially retired even though theyhadnot heldany job for two
years or more •Forthese individuals, the response is not taken at face value, and
for purposes of the estimation procedure the individual is classified as retired.
21n the data set we use, less than 1 percent of the sequences in which
the individual did not partially retire involve reversals, but about 20 percent
of the sequences in which the individualpartially retired do. For further
discussionof the extent of this problem, see Gustman and Steinmeier (1983b
and c).20
of Gordon and Blinder and other studies) normally predicts a progression from
being not retired at all to being fully retired, possibly with a spell of
partial retirement in the transition. Consequently, observations involving
reverse flows have a zero probability of occuring in the model and would pre-
clude maximum likelihood estimates from being obtained. These reverse flows
may represent the reactions of individuals to unexpected changes in circuxn—
stances, or they may be the result of individuals making errors in their
maiinizaticn calculations. Either possibility could be incorporated into the
model, but at the cost of a considerable increase in the complexity of the
estimation procedure. Rather than getting involved in a still more complicated
estimation procedure, we observe that the reverse parts of the sequences con-
tribute little useful information for bounding the combinations ofand
which the individual is likely to have had, and for this reason during the
estimation procedure we simply ignore the parts of the observed retirement
sequence Si which cause reverse sequences.1
The model requires two time paths for compensation, one for full-time
work and one for partial retirement work. Compensation has three components
which are considered in this paper: the wage offer, the increment in the
total discounted value of any pension benefits accruing on the job, and the
increment in the total discounted value of Social Security benefits accruing
for the additional work. For the wage offers, separate equations are estimated
1For example, consider the sequence FRFR, where F indicates a survey in
which the individual considered himself to be not retired at all and R in-
dicates a survey in which the individual considered himself to be fully retired.
The basic information in this sequence is that sometime between the first and
fourth survey the indifference curves became steep enough that the individual
quit full—time work and retired, and the indifference curves were not sharply
enough curved that the individual partially retired. This same basic infor-
mation is preserved if the retirement sequence is treated as FxxR, where x
represents an observation not used in the estimation procedure.21
for full—time work and for partial retirement work.1 Wage streams over the
life cycle are imputed using these estimated equations in conjunction with
the individual's job history as best it can be reconstructed from the infor-
mation in the survey. The overall height of the wage path is determined from
whatever wage observations are available, and the profile of the path is
drawn from the effects of the tenure, experience, and health variables in the
wage equations, with the tenure variable inferred from the job history.2
If there is no indication that the individual fiiceil mandatory retirement, it
ispresuxnt-1 tftit hecould have continued indefinitely in Iii..1n.t ful 1—time
job. If the individual did indicatethat he faced mandatory retirement, it
ispresumed that after the mandatory retirement date, he could have begun a
new full-time job in the same occupation, but at a wage rate which reflected
adrop in tenure to zero.
For individuals who indicated that they were eligible for pensions on
full—timejobs, the pension component of compensation is imputed on the basis
1All compensation figures are deflated to 1967 levels using the index
of hourly earnings taken from the Economic Report of the President, 1981,
Table B—36. The estimated wage equations are thus net of the effects both
of general price increases and of productivity increases. The issue of
selectivity bias in the estimation of these wage equations is addressed in
Gustman and Steinmeier (l983c).
2The use of tenure and experience as a basis for drawing the profiles
results in relatively smooth profiles over time, which in turn precludes in-
dividuals in the model from switching retirement states because of highly
fluctuating wage offers. For the partial retirement wage equation, tenure
and experience variables are excluded in order to simplify the control solu-
tionto thelife cycle model, but this exclusion docs hot result in any
seriousbias.Indeed, it might, whether convenient or not, have been necessary.
In partial retirement wage equations for jobs started after 55, these vari-
ables are not significant at conventional levels. But the real problem is
that for partial retirement wage equations for jobs started before age 55,
the coefficients are significant, but they imply, for those with over 40 years
of experience and ten years of tenure, an implausibly high rate of decline
in the wage offer (over 7% per year) for each additional year of experience.22
ofinformation regarding the normal retirement age, provisions for early
retirement, the early retirement age if applicable, and the amountofexpected
or actual pension benefits. No information is available in the Ri-is on the
type of pension plan or on the actuarial reduction rate which was applied to
benefits begun before the normal retirement age. In order to calculate
the present value of benefits, we assume that each individual faced a defined
benefitplan wherein the annual benefits are calculated by multiplying the
years of service times some dollar amountorsome proportion of final average
salary, and adjusted actuarially if the individual retires before the normal
1 retirement age:
P=abT
whereP is the dollar value of annual benefits,a is an actuarial adjustment
whichlowers benefits if the individual begins collecting them before normal
retirement age, b is a value for a given individual which is assumed to grow
in proportion to an index of nominal wages until the individual quits the
job and begins collecting benefits, and T is the number of years of service
accrued when the individual begins to collect benefits. In a final average
salary plan, b is interpreted as a measure of the final average salary times
an appropriate fraction, whereas in a plan stipulating benefits as a specified
dollar amount times years of service, b is interpreted as this specified
amount. In either case, b would be expected to grow roughly proportionately
1According to a study for the Urban Institute, which is based on the
BLS Level of Benefits Survey, more than 80 percent of the surveyed partic-
ipants belong to a plan which either ties their benefits to final pay or in
which they receive a dollar amount for each year of service (Sara Hatch et
al., 1981, p. 25). This study also reports data on actuarial reduction rates
which we use in the pension benefit calculations. These reduction rates
vary by broad industry and occupation.23
to theindex of nominal wages until the individual starts collecting bene-
fits. The value of the pension component of compensation is calculated by
computing the present discounted value of pension benefits if the individual
does not work another year in the jo computing the expected benefits if he does
work another year, and takingthedifference. The net effect of the various influ-
ences on pensions is to cause this increment in pension value to decline noticeably
around the age of early retirement and to decline sharply again around the age of
normal retirement, a result which is consistent with the recent work of Edward
Lazear (1982), Laurence Kotlikoff andDavidWise (1983), and others. There
are likely to beconsiderable errors in using the procedure adopted here,
which is essentially to use the reported datato calculate the pension com-
ponentas best we can, but the procedure does capture the sharp drops at the
early and normal retirement ages which are the main feature of pension accruals.
The calculation of theSocialSecurity component of compensation closely
parallels the calculation of the pension component. Thus, the Social Secur-
itycomponent is derived by calculating the present value of expected Social
Security benefits if theindividual continues to work for another year and
thepresent value of the benefitsif theindividualdoes not work another year,
andthen taking the difference. The calculations consider the effects of
Social Security which operate through the individual's ownbenefitsand, if
married, through the spouse's benefits andherpotential widow's benefits,
andthey incorporate two factors regarding Social Security benefits which have
receivedrecent attention in theliterature. First, the effects of automatic
benefit reconiputationdue to increased average monthly earnings, asstressed
by klan Blinder, Roger Gordon, and Donald wise (1980), areincluded)Second,
1Thecalculation of average monthly earnings uses the information in the
Social Security earnings records in the RHS until the individual reached age
(footnote 1 continued on next page)24
the early retirement penalty for retirement before 65 reflects the fact that
cost—of—living adjustments were based in this period on the entire primary
insurance amount, a practice which, as noted by Richard Burkhauser andJohn
Turner(1982), effectively causes the early retirement penalty amountnot
tobe indexed. The time pattern of the Social Security component of compen-
sation is similar to the pension component, namely, for most individuals there
is a sharp drop at the early retirement age and a further sharp drop at the
normal retirementage.The first drop appears to be due to the fact that
the penalty for retirement before age 65 is less than actuarially fair once
the effects discussed by Burkhauser and Turner are considered. The second
drop reflects the fact that after age 65 the actuarial adjustments were very
small during the sample period.
After the compensation paths are calculated in the manner just described,
a problem arises because sixteen (out of 494) individuals in the sample were
working full—time even though annual compensation in full—time work was less
than the potential annual compensation would have been in partial retirement
work, a situation which, not surprisingly, would not occur in the context of
the model and which therefore would preclude maximum likelihood estimates
from being obtained. This is very likely caused either by problems in the
wage imputation procedure, particularly for partial retirement wages, or by
misclassification of the individual as full-time when in fact he was partially
retired. As with the reverse sequences problem discussed before, it would
be possible to accommodate such observations in the context of a considerably
(footnote 1 continued from previous page)55. After that the wages imputed
in the procedure previously discussed are used. This is done to make sure
that the calculations fairly closely reproduce the effect of additional earn-
ings on average monthly earnings while at the same time allowing for the
fact that after age 55, the Social Security earnings records increasingly
fail to reflect potential earnings for those who partially or fully retire.25
more complicated model, but in view of the fact that such observations seem
to present very little information on either the slope or the curvature of
the underlying indifference curves of the individuals, for the estimation
at hand the best course of action appears to be simply to drop these observa-
tions.
V. Parameter Estimates.
The values of 'thecompensation paths, and the retirement sequences
as derived in the last section are inserted into the estimation procedure
described in Section III in order to obtain values for the parameters of in-
terest. In the course of this estimation, the relevant time horizon for the
life cycle calculations is assumed to be from age 25 to age 85, with the in-
dividual assumed to be working full—time before age 55 and to be completely
retired after age 72. Since the period of observation covers at most the age
range from 58 to 69, these assumptions never contradict any observed retirement
sequence, and they reduce the computation considerably. Further, since the
utility function is separable, the only effect of a violation of either
assumption would be relatively weak effects cperating through the marginal
utility of lifetime income.
One final difficulty remains to be resolved before estimates can be ob-
tained. This pertains to the assumption in many previous studies, including
that of Gordon and Blinder, that L(t) =0at full-time work. As can be seen
in equation (2), this is inconsistent with values of 5lessthan zero and hence
with an elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure which is
less than unity. There is no obviously "correct" choice for the value of
L(t) corresponding to full—time work, and the value chosen will affect the
interpretation of the indifference map (i.e., a given value of L(t) will26
represent a larger or smaller percentage of full—time work effort) and the
interpretation of the parameter estimates. However, the particular value
chosen should not greatly affect simulation results as long as the same def-
inition is used in both the estimation and the simulation, except that a
value close to zero is probably a poor choice. For the estimated results
presented here, L(t) takes on a value of 0.46 for full—timework.1
Table 1 presents estimates for several variants of the model discussed
in previous sections. Thefirstcolumn indicates the parameter estimates and
the estimated standard errors for the basic model. All of the parameters
except for the coefficient of vintage in the utility function, are signif-
icant at standard levels. Thecentralparameters in the model (y, o, and
appear to be determined fairly precisely.
Of this group of parameters, perhaps the most important is ,which
describes the effect of agein theutility function. Theestimatedparameter
value of 0.21 implies that the coefficient of the leisure term in the utility
function is growing by about 23 percent per year.2 In turn, this implies
that the indifference curves in Figure 1 are becoming steeper at the rate of
1The average workweek for those in full—time jobs was 45.31 hours, which
is 54 percent of the presumed available time of 84 hours per week. It might
appear that an alternative approach would be to treat the value of L(t) cor-
responding to full—time work as a parameter to be estimated. However, the
identification of this parameter would be extremely weak; indeed, in the esti-
mates which treat the number of hours in partial retirement work as fixed,
the only identification for this parameter would come from the assumed func-
tional forms of f(5) and f(cô). Under these circumstances, it appears
preferable to choose a reasonable value for the L(t) corresponding to full—
timework and tonote that the interpretation of the other parameters depends
to somedegreeon the value chosen.
2Since is part of an exponential expression, the percentage figure is
calculated as lOO(e021 —1).Similar conmtents apply to the other percentage




Model with Model with
Variable Single Fixed Single
Hours in Job Hoursin Job
Partial Variable Partial Fixed
Retirement Hours Retirement Hours
Workb Model Workb Model
constant —5.02 —25.82 —7.01 —24.33
(0.10) (0.55) (0.11) (0.31)
coefficient of age 0.21 0.36 0.24 0.39
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07)
coefficient of diy for 0.84 1.41 1.05 1.22
long—term health problem (0.10) (0.24) (0.13) (0.22)
coefficient of vintage 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.10
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
:parameterfor distribution 0.61 0.42
of 5intwo job models (0.04) (0.03
5:simpleparameter in single —0.15 0.15
job models (0.07) (0.04)
0 :standarddeviation of C 0.99 1.72 1.25 1.35
C (0.02) (0.18) (0.02) (0.19)
: correlation parameter in —8.78 -7.09
two job models (0.22) (0.13)
0: calculated median elasticity 0.87 0.87 0.60 1.18
of substitution between
consumption and leisure
number of observations 478 561 478 490
value of log—likelihood —1084.18 —653.75 —1111.85 —603.85
aStandard errors are in parentheses.
bmere was a large off—diagonal element in the information matrix involving
and p which made the information matrix nearly singular. This created some
amount of fluctuation in the estimated standard errors due to machine rounding.28
1
23 percent per year.The estimated value of 2' which is the coefficient
of the health variable, indicates that the onset of a long-term health pro-
blem causes the indifference curves to increase in slope by 132 percent,
which is equivalent to the effect caused by an increase of almost four years
in age. The estimated value of 0.99 for the parameter Gindicatesthat there
is a very large amountofindividual variation in the preference for leisure.
A single standard deviation in the error term reflecting individual pref-
erences for leisure is associated with a 169 percent difference in the slope
of the indifference curves measured at a particular age. It is this large
variation in individual preferences, combined with the relatively smaller
yearly effects of age on the slope of the indifference curves, which causes
individuals to retire over a range of ages beginning in the mid—50's and
extending into the 70's. For the parameter y, which governs the distribution
of the within-period elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure, the estimated value of 0.61 implies a median elasticity of substitu-
tion of 0.87, which is slightly on the inelastic side of unity.
In order to investigate what might happen if partial retirement jobs
are not distinguished fran full—time jobs in the estimation, Column 2 of the
table presents estimates for a model which considers only a single job for any
individual, and in which only the states of working and retirement are distinguished.2
1The 23 percentper year figure should beinterpreted as a linear approx-
imation to the effect of age on the utility of leisure during the observed age
range; it would probably be inappropriate to extrapolate this figure back to
younger ages.
a full set of parameters, the calculation procedure for the maximum
likelihood of the single job model does not converge. More precisely, it
approaches a maximum asymptotically as the parameter values approach infinity.
The problem appears to be that the stochastic structure with two stochastic
variables is more complicated than can be estimated when only the states of
working and retirement are distinguished. When the elasticity of substitution
(footnote 2 continued on next page)29
From the table, the most important difference between the two models is that
the single job model yields a substantially higher estimated value of and
therefore a substantially more rapid estimated rate at which an individual's
indifference curves become steeper as he grows older.1 This suggests that
retirement is more influenced by the rapid steepening of the indifference
curves and will be less influenced by the incentives provided by the budget
constraint in the single job model than in the two job model, a conjecture
that will be the subject of further investigation in the next section. The
greater value of could also be expected to be associated with a narrower
dispersion of retirement ages, but its effect in this regard is at least partly
offset by the higher value of a, which indicates a more heterogenous set of
preferences regarding leisure.
With regard to the elasticity of substitution, the estimates from the
single job model are slightly on the inelastic side of unity and are in fact
not very far from the median estimate from the two job model. Both estimates
are very much lower than the results of Gordon and Blinder, who found an
elasticity of about 10. This result is particularly puzzling in that the
(footnote 2 continued from previous page)is treated as a parameter rather
than as a stochastic distribution, as is usually done when similar models are
estimated by others, the maximum likelihood procedure does converge, as re-
ported in the table. With the elasticity of substitution treated as a para-
meter, however, p and are not separately identified, and only is
estimated.
1Since none of the models in Table 1 are nested in the statistical sense,
the standard specification tests using the log—likelihood values are not
applicable for determining which of these models, if any, is superior. To
illustrate the difficulties, consider an individual with a retirement sequence
FPR. In the two job model, he would be assigned the probability of small
diamond-shaped area such as PR in Figure 2.In the single job model, he
would be assigned the probability for a range of values of ,sincein that
modelis not considered to be stochastic. The inappropriateness of compar-
ing the log-likelihood values of the two models arises because the probabil-
ities of individual observations in the two models are not comparable. The
same kind of problem arises in interpreting an average log—likelihood value,
since it is averaging probabilities of areas such as with probabilities
of areas such as in Figure 230
single job model appears to be very close to the kind of model that Gordon
and Blinder in fact estimated. One possible source of difference is the pre-
viously noted caveat that the interpretation of this elasticity isaffected
by the choice of L(t) corresponding to full-time work, but even sothe Gordon-
Blinder elasticity still appears large in comparison to the results of this
study. In order to investigate this discrepency further, recallthat Gordon
and Blinder obtained their elasticity estimate from a reservation wage equation
of the form
in WR =(1-5)in Y +
whereWR is the current reservation wage,Y is a measure of full lifetime
income, and the coefficient of Y is the inverse of the elasticity. With the
Gordon—Blinder estimates, a 10 percent increase in the entire lifetime com-
pensation stream (and therefore Y) increases the current reservation wage by
only 1 percent, which should induce later retirement because current wage
offers are also higher by 10 percent. Thus an elasticity of 10 carries with
it the implication that a long—term secular increase in real compensation
levels should cause the average retirement age of successive cohorts to be
sharply increasing, which is at variance with postwar experience. It is pos-
sible to speculate that their high estimate of the elasticity may be due to
an error—in—variables problem with Y, both because of the difficulties in
measuring Y from the RHS data and because the definition of full income used
in their estimates does not correspond exactly with the theoretical construct
due to the problem noted in footnote 2 of page 2 of this paper. It is dif-
ficult to judge whether this can account entirely for the discrepency between
our results and those of Gordon and Blinder, however.
Column3of Table 1 presents estimates for a two job model in which hours31
in partial retirement work is fixed at a level below full—time effort.1 in
assumption of fixed hours in partial retirement work may be preferable to an
assumption of variable hours in a model which, in order to keep the complex-
ity of the model within reasonable limits, abstracts from possible fixed
costs of employment and lower limits on work effort even in the partial re-
tirement job. Column 4 presents estimates for a single job model with the
fixed hours assumption. In this model the individual is constrained to work
full—time if he works at all, and empirically the individual is treated as
retired unless he was working full—time. In comparing the fixed hours models
with each other and with the corresponding variable hours models of Columns
1 and 2, it is apparent that the fixed hours assumption does not greatly affect
the general conclusions that were drawn from the estimates of the variable
hours models. In particular, it is still the case that the single job model
yields much higher estimates for than does the two job model, and the estimates
from both fixed hours models are fairly close to the corresponding estimates
from the variable hours models. Under the fixed hours assumptions, the
elasticity estimate from the single job model is somewhat higher than the
estimate fromthetwo job model, but itisstill only a smallamountabove
unity and remains very much smaller than the Gordon—Blinder estimate for this
parameter. Estimates oftheremaining parameters vary by as muchas 15to
20percent from the corresponding estimates from thevariable hours models,
whichis a noticeable but riot an overwhelmingly large difference. In general,
the estimates do not appear to be extremely sensitive to whether fixed hours
or variable hours are assumed.
1The fixed amount of work effort in partial retirement jobs is assumed
to be 65 percent of full—time work effort, reflecting the fact that the
average workweek for those who were partially retired was 29.61 hours, or
65 percent of the average workweek for those in full-time jobs.32
The model is tested for sensitivity to several other assumptions, but
it appears to be fairly robust with respect to all of the assumptions in-
vestigated.1 Twoofthese tests are important enough to warrant specific
mention. First, the parameter estimates of the model move hardly at all when
the federal income tax is applied to the wage earnings for purposes of con-
structing the compensation streams. This result implies that any omitted
consideration which has a primary effect of shifting the entire wage streams
up or down (e.g., Social Security contributions) is unlikely to have more
thana relativelyminor impact on the estimated parameter values. Secondly,
the introduction of a 10 percent time preference, via a term of the form
e_0t which premultiplies the utility function, has only a very minor impact
on the estimated results. In these results, the estimated value of in-
creases almost exactly enough to offset ctp1etely the effect of time
preference in the coefficient of the leisure term in the utility function.
This result suggests that the omission of the time preference factor does not
matter very much as long as the model is used to investigate issues per-
taining to labor supply and retirement behavior.
VI. Implications of the Estimated Model.
The properties of the model maybeillustrated by using it to simulate
retirement behavior.Thesimulations are accomplished as follows. For each
individual in the sample, the value of the vector and the compensation
paths 1F (t) andY [H (t)]are calculated according to the procedure described
above.Theindividualwill retire, according to the lifecycle model, at
some age R, the value of which depends on the stochastic variables óand.
1Completeresults for these sensitivity tests may be found in Gustman
and Steinmeier (1983c).33
Let w.(R) be the set of all combinations of dande which imply that this
individual would retire at age R. Then the probability that an individual
with the characteristics indicated by X and facing the compensation path
YF(t) arid Y[H(t)] will retire at age R is found by integrating the prob-
ability density function forand C over the region w. (R):
1.
f.(R) =fff(5, )dc d5
1
1
Forthe entire sample, the simulated percentage of individuals who retire at
a given age R is found by taking the average value of f.(R) over the sample:
f(R) =—Ef.(R) N.
Thesameprocedure can be used to calculate the distribution of any other
statistic of interest concerning the simulated retirement decisions of the
sample.
Figure 3presentsa set of results derived from simulations of the two
jobmodel with fixed partial retirement hours) The first panel of this
figure indicates the simulated percentages of individuals who first retire
fromfull-time work at the indicated ages, and the second panel indicates
comparable percentages of individuals who fully retire at the ages. The main
feature of these results appears to be the substantial peaks in retirement
activity at ages 63 and 65. The two panels also indicate the analogous sta-
tistics derived from direct observation of white male—headed households in
1The tables of Appendix B present a more detailed set of the results of
the simulations on which Figures 3 and 4 are based. The fixed hours models
were used to minimize the potential problems resulting from the fact that
the model did not incorporate any possible effects caused by fixed costs of
employmentor by some minimumhours constraints on jobs held whilepartially
retired.— -.------—-T——Figre3._
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the RHS.1 It is encouraging that the simulated results fairly closely parallel
the observed distributions, and in particular that the two peaks at age 62
and 65 areat the same age and of approximately the samemagnitude in both
thesimulatedand observed distributions. It should be emphasized that the
peaks in the simulated results are not the result of dusmy agevariablesin
the utility function which produce sudden increases in the desire for leisure,
as has been the case in many previous studies.2 Rather, the peaks in the
simulated results axe the result of the effects of pension programs and the
Social Security program in changing the effective cnpensation of many indiv-
iduals at these ages.
The third panel of the figure ccpares the simulated and actual percen-
tages of individuals who were working full—time, partially retired, and fully
retired by age. For instance, at age 65, the percentage of individuals who
were fully retired was 1.7 percentage points lower in the simulation than was
actually observed at this age. This result is indicated by the fact that
the solid line in this panel is slightly below the axis at this age. The
simulation appears to track the percentage of individuals who were fully
retired to within 2 or 3 percentage points at most ages. However, it over-
states the percentage who were working full time, particularly in the age
1These figures were calculatedby taking the differences in the percen-
tages of individuals who were in particular retirement states in adjacent age
categories. For example, 41.1% of the sample reported themselves to be fully
retired at age 64, and 55.3% reported themselves to be fully retired at age
65. The difference of 14.2% is inferred to have fully retired at age 65.
The figures for the fraction of individuals who are inthe various retirement
statesat different ages are given in Table V—i in Gustznan and Steirimeier (1981).
2For instance, the reservationwage equation of Gordon and Blinder in-
cludes a duzty variable for a finite jump at age 65, a duzuny variable for age
62or greater which is interactedwith a Social Security wealth variable,
and a dtmy variable for age 65 or greater which isinteractedwith a pension
dummy variable. All of these tend to make the reservation wage change sudden-
ly at ages 62 and 65.36
range 64—66, and it understates the percentage who were partially retired.
The understatement of partial retirement in the simulation does not appear
to arise because a low percentage of individuals partially retire in the
simulation; approximately one third of the individuals in the simulation
partially retire at some time, which is roughly the same fraction which is
found in the observed behavior. Rather, it appears to be caused by a coef-
ficient on the age variable in the utility function which implies that indiv-
iduals who do partially retire spend too short a time in that state. In this
regard, it may be recalled that the coefficient of the age variable plays
two roles in the model. First, it governs the height of the peaks of retire-
ment activity at ages 62 and 65; the greater this coefficient, the less
sensitive retirement activity will be to the economic incentives in the
canpensation streams, and the lower will be the resulting peaks of retirement
activity. Secondly, the coefficient governs the length of time that any
individual who does partially retire spends in that state. A greater value
of the coefficient will in general result in shorter periods of partial retire-
ment. The estimated coefficient seems to have done a reasonable job in
reflecting the peaks of retirement activity, but it appears that one of the
trade—off s that the estimation procedure had to accept in order to do this
was to predict periods of partial retirementthat were somewhat too short.
The final panel of Figure 3 investigates the implications of a 50 percent
increase in the entire compensation streams for both full—time and partial
retirement work. This might correspond, for example, to the effects of in-
creases in labor productivity over a period of two to four decades. The re-
sults indicate that such an increase in canpensation would reduce the percen-
tage of individuals working full-time by about 10 percentage points up through
age 64 and by a smaller amount thereafter. The percentage of individuals who37
are fully retired increases by a comparable amount, and the effects on the
percentage of partially retired individuals is mixed. In terms of the average
retirement age, such an increase in real wages would cause the average age
to decline by a little less than one year. This result is perfectly plaus-
ible in light of recent experience and suggests that a substantial part of
the gradual decline in the retirement age in recent decades mightbeinter-
preted as an effect of the increasing levels of real income made possible by
advances in productivity.
Figure 4 addresses an issue discussed in the last section, namely: what
difference does it makeif weuse the estimates from oneof the single job
models ratherthan the estimates from the two jobmodel? The singlejob model
used in these simulations is the fixedhoursmodel, in the estimation of
which individuals were treated as working if they were working full-time and
as retired otherwise. The first two panels of Figure 4 present information
from the single job model comparable to the information in the first three
panels of Figure 3 regardingthe two job model. From the first panel of Figure
4,it isapparent that this model also produces peaks in retirement activity
ofapproximatelythe correct magnitude atages 62 and 65. In comparing the
first panels of Figures 3 and 4, however,the overall distributionof retire-
ment ages appears to be somewhat more concentrated for the single job model,
with more of the distribution between the ages of 62 and 65 and less of the
distribution before 62 or after 67. This impression is confirmed by the
second panel of Figure 4, which indicates that the single job model tends to
underpredict retirement byabout 8percentage points at age 62 and to over-
predictitby about 5 percentage points at age 68.1
1This result, whichmay at first appear curious, arises because the
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The last two panels in Figure 4 report on thecombinedsimulated effects
of Social Security, pensions, and mandatory retirement using both the single
job model and using the two job model. The magnitude of these effects is
measured by performing a simulation in which the compensation streams include
no pension or Social Security benefits, and no mandatory retirement, and
comparing the results to a simulation in which all of these effects are present
in the compensation streams) It was hypothesized that the higher value of
estimated for the single job model should make retirement behavior less
sensitive to the incentive effects provided by Social Security, pensions, and
mandatory retirement, and this impression is confirmed by the simulations.
For example, in the estimated two job model the combined effects of Social
Security and pension benefits and mandatory retirement is to cause the percen-
tage of individuals working full—time at age 66 to fall by 18.9 percentage
points. For the estimated single job model, the comparable reduction in the
percentage of individuals working at age 66 is 8.1 percentage points.2 It
(footnote 1 continued from page 37) to- retire at the same time that their
compensation exhibits a sharp decline.(In terms of Figure 2, a sharp decline
in compensation causes the boundary between working and retirement to shift
more to the left than usual, making possible a large gain in the likelihood
function if the estimation procedure assigns a high probability density to
this area.) Since the single job, fixed—hours model treats retirement as the
departure from full—time work, the association between retirement and the
compensation declines at ages 62 and 65 is greater than with the other models,
and as a result the estimates imply a more concentrated distribution of re-
tirement in the 62—65 age range than occurs with the other models.
1For estimates Qf the separate effects of pensions, Social Security and
mandatory retirement, see Gustman and Steinmeier, 1983c.
2Since the sensitivity of retirement behavior to changes in the budget
constraint is related to the magnitude of l' the single joL variable hours
model would exhibit the same kind of reduced sensitivity as the single job,
fixed hour model. However, since the estimated value of the standard devia-
tion of Cisgreater in the single job variable hours model, this model would
imply a less concentrated distribution of retirement ages than does the single
job fixed hours model, indicating that a low sensitivity of retirement behavior
to changes in the budget constraint is not necessarily associated with a small
dispersion of retirement ages.40
appears highly likely that the insensitivity of retirement behavior in the
estimated single job model relative to the two job model would exten1 to
most potential policy changes which would alter the incentive structure of
the individual's lifetime compensation streams. 2\ccordingly, not only is
the two job model consistent with evidence cited at the outset as to the im-
portance of minimum hours constraints in full time work and the availability
of partial retirement, and thus the correct model to use, but we have now
shown that applying the wrong model may have important consequences for pre-
dicted retirement behavior and for policy analysis.
VII. Conclusions.
This work has emphasized the significance of a more realistically specified
life cycle model in the empirical analysis of retirement behavior than those
used in previous studies. The estimated model behaves ma sensible manner,
particularly in being able to approximate fairly closely the peaks in retire-
ment activity at ages 62 and 65. Moreover, the model can be used to predict
how a policy change will affect the number of people seeking full-time work
and partial retirement work, which is the first step in understanding the labor
market substitutions which can result from changes in retirement policies.
The fact that the model can handle policies which have potentially very compli-
cated effects on an individual's lifetime budget constraint underscores the
potential usefulness •of this kind of a model in analyzing the effect of al-
ternative policies on retirement behavior.
Earlier work has established the importance of minimum hours constraints
in the higher-paying full—time jobs that individuals typically hold in their
primary working years, and the current work reinforces earlier suspicions
that to ignore these constraints may cause serious biases in terms of under—41
standing the way retirement behavior may respond to various policy changes.
The manner in which individuals choose in their later years between full-
timework at one level of compensation and partial retirement work at a
relatively lower level of compensation yields potentially useful information
regarding the nature of the individual's preferences andtherate at which
these preferences arechanging withage, but this information has been largely
ignored in most of the estimation work done to date. Taking these consider-
atris into account affects the estimates of important parameters regarding
preferences, andthesedifferences in parameter estimates, in turn, increase
the estimated sensitivity of retirement behavior to manypotentialchanges
in policy. Indeed, retirement behavior appears to be approximately twice
as sensitive to policy changes in the correctly specified model.42
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AppendixA
Computation Techniques
Two assumptions of the model considerably ease the computational burden
of evaluating the likelihood function. They are, first, the assumption that
f(ej.) is distributed normally, and secondly, that u is separable with
respect to consumption and leisure. This brief appendix will sketch how
these assumptions do in fact simplify the calculations..1
Consider as an illustration the problem of evaluating the probability
that individual i is fully retired in year M. This corresponds to the region
in Figure 2(a). Using the fact that f(ej5.) is distributed normally,
this probability can be written as
Pr.(R; e)= 1(1f(C. j6.)dc.]d& 1 —
RI5.




where2 is the range of values ofin for a given value of 5., c R 1
is the minimum of this range, and F(.] is the cumulative normal distribution
function. Since there are standard routines to evaluate the cumulative normal
using function approximations, this sixnp.lification permits the (numerical)
integration to be performed over one dimension rather than two, provided that
a way can be found for evaluation C
Qj•
Theseparability of the utility function allows this critical value of
C to be found without iterative techniques. The first step in the procedure
1The descriptionin this appendix assumes that L(t)=O for full-time work.
IfL(t)>Oat full—time work, the appropriate modifications would not signif-
icantly increase the complexity of the calculations.A- 2
for doing so is to ascertain whether, for a given 5.,theboundary of is
with or with ftp,.The answer to this question can be illustrated with the
aid of Figure 1. Suppose that for this value of (5.,c takeson just the
right value so that the indifference curve through A is tangent to the line
segment AB of the budget line at time t. If this same indifference curve
passes below D in the diagram, then it will be impossible tofind a value
ofsuch that the individual partially retires at time t. This implies that
for this value of C, the boundary of is with .Ifthe indifference curve
passes above D, then for some values of C the individual will partially retire
at time t, and in this case the boundary of is with
To find the value ofsuch that the indifference curve through A is
tangent to AB, first note that with the CES utility function, the maximiza-
tion problem at time M becomes
maximize sign(6){[C(M)] +e [L(M)]+k e_rM[Y(M) —c(M)]}
where for convenience the i subscripts have been dropped. Since consumption,
leisure, and income are additively separable in this expression, and since
the definition of '1(M) does not involve consumption, this maximization problem
separates into the following two problems:
(5 -rM maximize sign((5) [C(M)]
—ke C(M)
maximize sign(6)e [L(MH5 +kerM '1(M)
For the indifference curve through A to be tangent to AB, the second maximiza-
tion problem must have a tangent (i.e., not a corner) solution at L(M) =1
when'1(M) =W(M)(1-L(MH,where w(M) isthewage rate for partialretire-
ment work at time M. For this to happen, it must be true that the derivativeA- 3
of the maximandofthe second problem with respect to L(M) must be equal to
zero when evaluated at L(M) =1:
x+ce —kerMW(M) =0
1
Solvingthis expression for (e 7k) yields:
-x-M--rM
e /k =e e
Since, given values ofand ó,theright-hand side of this equation canbe
calculated,the requirement that the problem should have a tangent solution
at L(M) =1at time M fixes a value for a ratio involvingand k. However,
it does not allow the two variables to be separately determined.
Fortunately, the question of whether or not the indifference curve tan-
gent to AB at A passes above or below D can be answered without resolving the
ratio (eC/k) into its numerator and denominator separately. Since k must
always be positive, themaximandof the second problem can be written equiv-
alently as
x
(A.l) maximize sign(cS) (eC/k) e (L(M)]6 +erM
Y(M)
Using the value of (eC/k) just determined, the issue of whether the indiffer-
ence curve passes above or below D reduces to whether this expression is
greater at A or at D. Substituting the appropriate values of L(M) and Y(M)
at points A and D into this expression and making the comparison implies that
the indifference curvetangent to AS atA passes below D if
-rM C
e YF(M) >sign(S)(e7k) e
similarprocedure can be used to find the value of the expression
(eC/k)under theassumption that hours of work in partial retirement are fixed
at somelevelbelowfull time hours.A—4
and passes above it otherwise.
If this indifference curve passes above D, then the boundary of is
with and the critical value ofis the one associated with the indif-
ference curve which is just tangent to AB at A. This tangency is interpre-
ted as meaning that the individual is just on the borderline between partial
and full retirement at time M. The value of the ratio (es/k) associated
with this indifference curve has already been found; what remains is to find
the value ofseparately. To find this value, first note that t any time
t, the second maximization problem may be written as
-t— 5-rt
maxinuze sign(5) (e /k) e [L(t)j+e Y(t)
After substituting the appropriate value for (eE/k), this maximization problem
determines the labor supply for every time t in the life cycle. From this,
it is possible to calculate the present discounted value of total lifetime
earnings, which may be denoted as Now consider the maximization problem
involving consumption at time t:
maximize sign(s) [C(t)]6 —kert C(t)
From this, consumption for any period t can be calculated as
1
(A.2) C(t) =[kert/6)6l
The present discounted value of the consumption stream must be equal to
in order to satisfy the lifetime budget constraint
=Tet dt
Since T has already been determined, this relationship provides a means of
calculating k once the expression for C(t) in equation (A.2) is substituted.A- 5
With this value of k, and with the value of (eC/k) previously calculated,
it is possible to compute the value of Cforwhich the individual would be
just on the borderline between partial and full retirement at time t, given
the particular value of 5.This is thevalueof cwhich marks the boundary
betweenandfor this value of 5.
Ifthe indifference curve tangent to AB at A passes below D, then the
boundary of is with .Inthis case, the critical value ofis the one
associated with the indifference curve which passes simultaneously through
A and D, that is, the value of c for which the individual is just on the bor-
derline between working full—time and retiring fully. Since this indifference
curvepasses through both points, for the correct value ofthe maximand in
equation(A.l)must have the same value at both points. Substituting the
appropriatevalues of L(M) and Y(M) at these pointsinto the expression and
setting the two results equal to each other yields the equation
eMYF(M) =sign(6)(eC/k) e
This equation may besolvedfor thecritical value of (eE/k) forwhich an in-
difference curve passes through both A and D at time M. Using this value of
the ratio (eC/k), the separate value of k may be inferred, as in the last
case,by using the lifetime budget constraint. The valu? of k can then be
used to calculate thecritical value of cforwhich the individual would be
jnstonthe borderline between full—time work and full retirement, or alterna-
tively interpreted, the value of cwhichmarks the boundary betweenand
The two types of boundaries discussed inthe last two paragraphs are
sufficientto calculate the probability associated with Forprobabilities
involving Q. or Q, however, it is necessary to calculate the value of cfor
a third type of boundary,namely the boundary betweenand .AtthisA—6
boundary point, the individual is just on the borderline between full-time
work and partial retirement at time M, and the critical value of E is the
one associated with an indifference curve which is tangentsomewhere along
the segmented line ABC and which passes through D. Unlike the values of E
for the other kinds of boundary points, the critical value offor this
boundary cannot be calculated directly but must be approximated by aniterative
procedure. Essentially, this iterative procedure begins with some point along
ABC. Using the methods discussed earlier, the value of(es/k) associated
with the indifference curve tangent to ABC at this point is found (at a kink
point such as B, a tangent indifference curve is considered to be anyindif-
ference curve which is locally above ABC except at B). With this value of
(eE/k), the value of the maximand in question A.2 is examined both at the
point and at D to determine whether this indifference curve passes above or
below D. If it passes above D, the next point considered along ABC will be
to the left of the original point, and otherwise the next point will be to
the right of the original point. This process is continued until an indif-
ference curve is found which is tangent to ABC and which passes within a given
tolerance distance from D.1 From the value of the ratio (eE/k) associated
with this indifference curve, the values ofand k may be separated using
the lifetime budget constraint in the manner described before.
The foregoing discussion suggests how to calculate any of the three kinds
of boundaries for a given year M, which is sufficient to allow the probabil-
ities of , and for that year to be computed. For a multiyear sequence,
11f the segmented line ABC has non—convex bends, as may be associated,
for instance, with the exhaustion of Social Security benefits due to the earn-
ings test so that further earnings are not subject to the reduction, then
there may be more than one indifference curve which is tangent to the seg-
mented line and which passes through D. In such a case, we are interested in
the one which has the lowest ratio (eC/k), that is, the one with the smallest
(in absolute value) slope at point D.A- 7
theprocedure is very similar, except that the calculation of the limits of
whereSis the sequence, will in general involve the calculation of
boundarypoints associated with more than one year.Forexample, consider
the area in Figure 2(b). In order to calculate the probability of this
region, it is necessary to calculate the boundaries between andS2and
between and in Year 1 and the boundaries between and in Year 2.
Letthevalues of Cassociatedwith these three boundary points be denoted as
and C2 ,respectively.Then the probability of the sequence
l,Fl,R
PR?.canbe calculated as
Pr(PR.R; 0)!(F((c1 R _FNmax[C1F, C2,R] -
Similarexpressionsmaybe readilyderived for any other sequence of the kind
illustrated in Figure 2(b).B—i
2ppendixB
TableB.l
Simulations with the Two Job, Fixed Hours Model.
percent retiring, by age
percentpercentpercent
from full— from all working partiallyfully
age time work work full—time retiredretired
A. Base Simulation.
61 4.8 4.0 78.8 4.6 16.6
62 11.9 10.1 66.9 6.4 26.7
63 8.5 7.8 58.4 7.1 34.5
64 6.6 5.8 51.8 7.9 40.3
65 19.7 13.3 32.1 14.3 53.6
66 6.8 7.3 25.3 13.8 60.9
67 5.8 6.1 19.5 13.5 67.0
68 4.9 4.8 14.6 13.6 71.8
69 4.2 5.0 10.4 12.8 76.8
B.Observed Results.a
61 6.2 4.8 76.3 7.5 16.2
62 12.8 8.5 63.5 11.8 24.7
63 6.8 5.1 56.7 13.5 29.8
64 13.6 11.3 43.1 15.8 41.1
65 17.4 14.2 25.3 19.4 55.3
66 8.0 7.0 17.7 20.0 62.3
67 1.9 21 15.8 19.8 64.4
68 3.2 5.1 12.6 17.8 69.5
69 0.9 0.8 11.7 18.0 70.3
C. Real Compensation Streams Increased by 50%.
61 5.7 4.9 69.1 7.8 23.1
62 11.8 10.4 57.3 9.2 33.5
63 8.4 8.5 48.9 9.1 42.0
64 7.0 7.0 41.9 9.1 49.0
65 16.6 13.0 25.3 12.7 62.0
66 5.5 6.8 19.8 11.4 68.8
67 4.9 5.8 14.9 10.5 74.6
68 3.8 4.7 11.1 9.6 79.3
69 3.1 4.4 8.0 8.3 83.7
D.Pension and Social Security Benefits and Mandatory Retirement
Eliminated
61 4.9 4.1 80.4 4.0 15.6
62 8.0 6.8 72.4 5.2 22.4
63 8.6 7.6 63.8 6.2 30.0
64 6.4 5.7 57.4 6.9 35.7
65 6.0 5.2 51.4 7.7 40.9
66 7.2 6.2 44.2 8.7 47.1
67 9.4 8.8 34.8 9.3 55.9
68 7.3 7.4 27.5 9.2 63.3
69 4.8 4.7 22.7 9.3 68.0
a
Calculated as the difference in percentages in the indicated state in adjacent
age categories. See footnote 1 on p. 35 in the text for further discussion.B-2
Table B.2
Simulations with the Single Job, Fixed Hours Model.
percent retiring, percentpercent
age by age workingretired
A. Base Simulation
61 6.5 83.5 16.5
62 12.1 71.4 28.6
63 11.1 60.3 39.7
64 11.7 48.6 51.4
65 19.6 29.0 71.0
66 8.8 20.2 79.8
67 7.2 13.0 87.0
68 5.4 7.6 92.4
69 3.5 4.1 95.9
B. Observed Resuitsa
61 6.2 76.3 23.7
62 12.8 63.5 36.5
63 6.8 56.7 43.3
64 13.6 43.1 56.9
65 17.4 25.3 74.7
66 8.0 17.7 82.3
67 1.9 15.8 84.2
68 3.2 12.6 87.4
69 0.9 11.7 88.3
C. Pension and Social Security Benefits and Mandatory Retirement
Eliminated.
61 7.0 82.1 17.9
62 9.5 72.6 27.4
63 10.5 62.1 37.9
64 11.7 50.4 49.6
65 12.0 38.5 61.5
66 10.1 28.3 71.7
67 8.4 19.9 80.1
68 6.9 13.0 87.0
69 5.1 7.9 92.1
a
Calculated as the difference in percentages in adjacent age categories.
For this model, an individual is counted as working if he holds a full—
time job, andasretired otherwise.